Question Two. Whether it was in the power of Christ’s Soul not to Die from the Violence of the Passion

8. Next to this, I ask whether it was in the power of Christ’s soul not to die from the violence of the passion.

9. That it was:

Because his soul perfectly dominated the sense appetite and all lower powers with its will, for there was no rebellion of those powers in him; therefore his soul had full dominion over the body so as to be able to prevent any bodily violence. The proof of the consequence is that his soul dominated his body with despotic rule (the way a master rules a slave), and dominated his sense appetite and the other lower powers with political rule (the way a king or prince dominates over citizens);     therefore his soul dominated his body more than it dominated the other powers, because a slave has no power against his master but a citizen has power against the prince and sometimes contradicts him; therefore etc     .

10. Secondly as follows: in John 10.17-18 Christ says, “I have power to lay down my soul,” and, “I lay down my soul from myself and no one takes it from me.” I ask, when he says “I lay down my soul from myself” how is he using the ‘lay down from myself’? Not from himself as the God-Word, for he never laid down his soul from himself as Word since his soul was never separated from the Word. Therefore he says this as he is man, because he was able to lay down his soul from himself by separating soul from body; therefore it was in the power of his soul to suffer separation from the body and not to suffer separation from the body.

11. Third, there follows a verse in the same chapter of John where Christ says, “This commandment have I received from my Father,” namely ‘to lay down my soul’; but he only received the commandment as he is man, for in his divinity he is equal with the Father; therefore he laid down his soul as man and as less than the Father. Therefore it was in his power as man to lay down and not to lay down his soul; it is plain when he says, “no one takes it from me but I lay it down of myself.”

12. Fourth, in several Gospels are contained the words that “with a loud cry he gave up his spirit;” but he could not have thus cried aloud unless he had freely forestalled the hour of death that was going to happen to him because of the violence of the passion; before that hour, therefore, he laid down his soul of his own power, and for the same reason he was able not to have laid it down both at that time and later; therefore it was in his power to die or not to die from the violence of the passion.

13. On the contrary:

Christ was in the same state as us as regards his body, and he was also a wayfarer; therefore violence could have been inflicted on him in his body whereby the harmony of the body would have been destroyed (as is very plain in ourselves), and so his body would have been deprived of life.

14. Second: if it was in Christ’s power to keep his body from all exterior violence, then, since he was bound, like everyone else, to guard himself from death, he would consequently have committed sin by dying; for he was bound by the law of charity to love his body next after love of God, of his soul, and of the souls of his neighbors. Thus, if he laid down his soul or permitted it to be laid down, then, since he could have preserved it instead, he would qua man have sinned; for he who does not prevent the dissolution of his body when he can sins.

I. To the First Question

A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. To the first question many say that Christ was under a necessity to die, because the potency of matter was of the same nature in him as in other men; and because it was deprived of other forms; and because deprived matter is a necessary cause of corruption     etc .

16. Second, because in Christ’s body there were contrary qualities, for the qualities of the elements are not in altogether equal proportion in a mixed body that is proportioned to the soul (for one part is complexioned differently from another, and life consists principally in the hot and wet and in other things that are equally proportioned); therefore      because there was thus a domination of one or other quality and contrariety, corruption would eventually and necessarily have followed their mutual action and passion.

17. Third, from the fact that the elements in the body desire their proper places when they are outside them, corruption and dissolution would also eventually have happened by nature; for natural desire is not in vain for ever, for ‘nothing violent is perpetual’ [On the Heavens 2.3286a17-18].

18. Fourth, the diverse parts of the organic soul are complexioned differently, and in addition one quality is dominant in the eye and another in other organs, and these qualities are contrary; so from the mutual action and passion of the parts would follow a necessity for corruption of the parts; but the corruption of the whole follows on the corruption of the parts;     therefore etc     .

19. Again, every generable and corruptible body has a definite period and measure or duration of existence, beyond which it cannot last; but Christ’s body was generable and corruptible;     therefore etc     .

2. Rejection of the Opinion

20. These arguments are not conclusive because the conclusions of all of them - apart from the last - apply as much to the body of Christ as it is now after the resurrection (and to our bodies too after the last judgment) as to his body as it was before.

21. The first argument [n.15] is not conclusive because Christ’s body has now the same potency of matter as before, and it is similarly deprived, for it has no other act now than before; therefore just as the act or form of his soul did not take away every privation before when it communicated itself to the body through the essence, so neither does it do so after the resurrection.

22. The second and third arguments are not conclusive [nn.16-17] because Christ’s body in heaven is a mixed body, and there is contrariety in it there as before. The elements too by nature are in their proper places, although they are outside, and more outside, their places now than they were when in Christ’s body before his death; and in the body in itself, and not as it is taken as to its sense organs, earth dominates the most; but earth is most outside its place when it is in heaven, and so it would, by desiring its proper place, do most to cause corruption.

23. The fourth argument [n.18] is not conclusive because the same result follows for the organic parts, for they will, after the resurrection, be of the same complexion as they were before; otherwise they would not be the same parts. So if they were cause of corruption before they will still be so afterwards; and so their complexion will be as necessarily corrupted afterwards as before if they were a necessary cause of corruption.

24. Now the fifth argument [n.19] assumes a false premise, namely that everything generable has a definite period etc.; for posit some stone in existence and take away everything external that is corruptive of it; if the divine maintaining power is also posited along with this general fact, the stone will never be corrupted; it is not then because of an extrinsic agent or because it has a definite limit of duration that it is corrupted. But if mixed bodies are necessarily corrupted, this is through an intrinsic cause, and especially in the case of animate things since in these a contrary quality dominates - as heat, which however is continually fostered in the wet and the wet continually tends toward corruption through the action of the heat. Thus at length, through the action of the heat, there is a corruption of the wet at the root, being a quicker corruption in some and slower in others according as the action of the heat is more or less strong. And so there is no need for a definite external corruptive cause. And thus the limit of generable and mixed corruptible things is longer or shorter because of an intrinsic cause; and something within is cause of the period of corruption rather than something outside. Likewise, the simple elements in mixed bodies are not corrupted in their totality but in part, and that because of the action of some other contrary on them. - But why is it that the contrary acts on it now and not earlier? Surely from the removal of the extrinsic cause that was conserving and producing it always the same. For fire here below is corrupted in winter by the action of the dominating cold, the cause of which is the sun being further away; while in the summer the fire part is generated and the cold near the fire is corrupted, the cause of which is the nearness of the sun. Remove these causes and a simple body is not corrupted because of any definite limit it has in itself, but the limit of the thing follows the cause of corruption, and it is longer or shorter for a cause other than the fact that the thing has a limit.

B. Scotus’ own Response

25. To the question then I reply as follows: first by comparing the Word that assumes to the nature that is assumed; second by comparing the nature to its accompanying quality; and third by comparing the assumed nature with its qualities to glory and punishment.

26. Now as to the first point it can be taken in two ways:

Either by comparing the Word as going to assume to the glorious nature to be assumed, for the Word was able to assume a nature simply glorious - and a simply glorious body would in no way have had a necessary cause of corruption.

27. Or in another way, by comparing the Word to the assumption of an innocent nature which, because it is without sin and is a pure nature, has original justice and innocence, as far as concerns the nature in itself. And thus too there was in the nature no cause deserving of death; and so, because of some gift, namely the gift of original justice, it was able not to die.

28. As to the next point [n.25], by comparing the Word to the assumption of a glorious body in such a way that, because of a miracle, the glory did not redound to the body; and thus, when the miracle was performed in the third instant, there necessarily followed in the fourth instant a cause of necessity for corruption of the body, that is, for the separation of soul from body. Consequently, by comparing the Word to the assumed glorious nature, and when in the third instant there was no redounding of the glory into the body, then I say that there was not only a necessity for the body to be mortal but there was a special miracle for the body to be mortal, because a new miracle impeded the redounding of the soul’s glory into the body. And when this new miracle was performed, the body was under a necessity to die, both because glory did not redound into it and because it did not have (as to the body) original justice preserving it from corruption.

29. A confirmation that the body was under a necessity to die when this miracle was performed comes from Augustine, On Baptism of Infants, [On Merits of Sins, 2.29.n.48], who speaks thus expressly.

30. But where does this necessity of dying come from?

This was because the body, when left to itself (if one compares nature to its principles and to the qualities that naturally follow nature [n.25]), was, by privation of glory, an animal body and so was not under a full enough dominion of the soul to prevent passion in the body. Therefore too the body underwent depletion and restoration through consumption of food; but, if the soul did not have complete dominion over the body, the restoration was incapable of being so perfect that the body would remain immortal.

31. On the contrary: Christ knew how much had to be taken up for the restoration of so much that was lost, in order that as much as had been lost would be restored.

32. I reply that although he knew this yet there are two reasons that the conclusion does not follow, namely weakness in the nutritive power for converting food and impurity of the food that he took in.

33. As to impurity of food [n.32], I believe that if Adam had had our food he would have died of old age. So it is plain that, by reason of the food, ‘not anything is able to be generated from anything’ (‘from anything’ as from the term of generation) [Physics 1.5.188a33-34], but a determinate thing is generated from a determinate thing. And so, from a purer and better food better blood is generated, and from better and purer blood the body becomes more compact and permanent; hence from corrupt and impure food a very loose flesh is generated. The impurity, then, of Christ’s food by comparison with Adam’s would have been an extrinsic cause of corruption in Christ (as it is in us), for there would not have been, on the part of the food, as full a restoration as there was a loss.

34. But on the supposition that Christ would have had the ‘tree of life’, would his body have been incorruptible [n.32]? I say no but that he had an intrinsic cause of dying, for every finite natural power (left to itself and not preserved by some gift conferred on it) suffers and is weakened when acting on anything material; and I say that, from the fact the power is finite, then the more it is able to act the more its power is weakened, because it cannot act sufficiently for the conservation of the individual (the point is plain from the nutritive power in us, for its power, by long action on and daily conversion of food, is weakened so much that it cannot convert more, and the man dies). The nutritive power in Christ, left to itself, was of this sort, and so it was at length weakened so much that it could no longer effect restoration.

35. The weakness, then, of his nutritive power and the impurity of the food from without would have been naturally a sufficient cause of Christ’s death.

C. Doubts and their Solution

36. But there are some doubts about this:

For it seems that when Christ’s body was united with the Word it would, without any other miracle, have been preserved from all corruption, for his assumption of the body was of the sort that what was assumed would never be dismissed (according to Damascene, 4.1); therefore it could not have been the case that, while the union of the body with the Word lasted, any part of the flesh would have flowed away and been corrupted, because then what was assumed would have been dismissed; indeed, if its parts did flow away then this seems to have been because of a miracle; therefore it was a miracle that Christ died rather than something natural.

37. Second, because if the parts did flow away then there was restoration of a new part, and that not without a new miracle, because the new part is not united by the old miracle just as the old part is not united by a new miracle; therefore by another miracle.

38. I say to these doubts [nn.36-37] that, after the miracle that the glory of Christ’s soul did not redound to his body, there was necessity that the parts of the body should flow away through sweatings and other consumptions; for, when active and passive powers are naturally brought close to each other, consumption must happen if one of the powers dominates the other; but the nutritive power was not able to restore from the food what was lost by their mutual action; and so there was a necessity for a flowing away of parts and for corruption.

39. To the first argument [n.36], when it is said that ‘what was once assumed was never dismissed’, this is true of the principal parts of a man’s body that come together for man’s perfection (of this sort are the heterogeneous parts, as heart, head, and hands); but some other parts were dismissed, as suppose he cut his nails or shaved his hair, and so on about parts of flesh and other things; indeed the whole under the idea of ‘whole’ was dismissed, because the whole as integrated with its parts was not always united, as was plain above [d.2 n.95]; yet the principal parts were always united, and it is about them that Damascene speaks.

40. To the second [n.37], when it says that then another part was added and united by a new miracle, I say that it was not by a new miracle but by the old one. Here one must note that just as the generative power has to generate something distinct in being and place and separate, so the nutritive power has to generate something the same and united, for nutrition is the generative addition of one thing to another through identity and unity with that other. And I say that the generation of a new part - united to the body - which the body used to have was something merely natural, and the fact that flesh newly generated would be part of the pre-existing body is something natural to both. But the fact that a part be united to the Word was a miracle but not a new one; rather it was done by the old one, because every part of the whole, and everything which is actually part of it, is united by the miracle whereby the whole body was first united to the Word. Nevertheless the natural power did something preparatory for the old miracle, because it brought it about that something was actually part of the body that before was not part of it; but once the old miracle has been performed, that part is united to the Word by the union of the whole, and it is caused by the Word and by the whole Trinity.

D. To the Principal Arguments

41. To the first principal argument [n.2] the answer is that the body is, because of sin, mortal by demerit; and from this it follows that there was no sin in Christ from the first instant in which he assumed innocent nature; and there was in him, from the first instant of nature, no cause of death by demerit. And this in response to the quotation from Genesis, that, after Adam had eaten, the first parents had by demerit a necessity to die - also the reasoning [about Adam] does not proceed in this way, but the cause is different, as was said toward the end of the question [n.30].

42. To the second [n.3], after conceding the antecedent, I deny the consequence, and the reason is that an omnipotence for producing anything possible cannot be conferred on a creature, or on anything, unless the thing has in itself one or several forms wherein is rooted a power for making everything possible first come to be; but this sort of form cannot be one or many accidental forms, for an accident does not and cannot have in itself (while it remains an accident) a power for producing all substances, or any substance (I mean producing ‘from itself’); therefore the omnipotence would have to be in the thing by some substantial form that contains virtually, and in perfection, every form or being that is able to come to be. But such a power cannot be conferred on Christ’s soul while it remains a soul, nor on an angel; therefore neither can an act of making cool be conferred on it; and so such a form virtually containing everything is repugnant to it while its nature remains. But to be able to know everything knowable, since to know is not to produce things in being, requires only an intellective power and a habit or the accidental species of which the soul is capable; and because knowing tends to knowable things not by causing them but by knowing them only, therefore the foundation for knowing simply does not require as much perfection as the foundation of a power requires for being able to cause everything possible.

43. To the third [n.4], when it is said that Christ knew equally well how to guard and to restore, I say that he knew if (for the state in which he was) he had had pure food and an unweakened nutritive power; but both of these were lacking; so there was no conversion of food into blood and flesh as pure as before (so that he should remain always), nor was his power as intense in converting food.

43. To the fourth, when it is said that Christ’s soul was most perfect and so it took away every privation (as the form of the heavens does), I say that just as the form of the heavens is not such as to contain all forms in itself perfectly and virtually and causally, so it cannot take away all privation and potentiality in its matter for some other form (if there is matter and potency in the heavens for other forms); and so if in the heavens there is matter of the same nature as here below, there is necessarily privation of matter and potentiality in it for other forms. And therefore, if the heavens are incorruptible, one must say that either its form is simple or that, if it has matter, it is of a different nature and is in potency only to the form that the heaven has of itself.

E. To the Form of the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

45. But as to a response to the form of the arguments for the first opinion above [nn.15-19] (about how those features [sc. the features that conflict with incorruptibility] exist in glorious bodies and yet are incorruptible), it belongs to Ord. 4 d.49 q.13 nn.2-11, and therefore is to be put off until then.

II. To the Second Question

A. Solution

46. To the question posed second above [n.8], whether it was in the power of Christ’s soul not to die from the violence of the passion, I say that if Christ’s soul had been left to itself absolutely then, from the fact it was glorious, its glory would have redounded to the body, and consequently it would have been in the power of the soul not to die from any passion.

47. But because, in the fourth instant, his body was, by a miracle, without the redounding into it of glory (as is plain from the preceding question [nn.28-30]), the body was in the fourth instant necessarily corruptible through passion.

48. Nor was it in the power of the soul to preserve the body from suffering. The reason is that, by the institution of nature, it was the case that, after the Fall, some of the active elements were of a nature to dominate over some of the passive ones - then the argument goes: all bodies capable of change and corruption can be corrupted by the approach to them of the dominating active element; Christ’s body was of this sort from the first instant of union until death; therefore through the approach of such active element a disposition or quality could have been induced in the body that was incompossible with the passive animation of the body, and so the body could have been deprived in life or by death, because the soul perfects only a body disposed to it.

B. Objections

49. If you say that, just as the soul is created and united [sc. with the body] by God alone, so God alone can separate it, and thus nothing else (no cause of suffering) can separate the soul - nothing else, I mean, other than the first Uniter.

50. A second proof is that if keeping the body from suffering was not in the power of Christ’s soul, then his passion and his soul’s separation were not voluntary, and so not meritorious either.

51. Third, that if not-dying was not in the power of Christ’s soul then his suffering was coerced; and if so, it was not meritorious.

C. Response to the Objections

52. To the first of these objections [n.49], when it says that only God can unite the soul to the body, there could be a doubt whether at the resurrection (when the body will be supremely disposed to the soul) the soul could reunite itself or whether, in generating man, it unites the intellective soul to the body, meaning by ‘union’ the organizing and fitting disposition of the body so it is ultimately perfectible by the intellective soul. Now as to the first point [sc. the union or reunion of soul to body] the place for discussing it is found in Ord. 4 d.43 q.3 nn.21-22, q.4 n.15. But if one concedes the antecedent (that ‘only God can unite the soul to the body’), I deny the consequence (that ‘only God can cause separation’ [of the soul from the body, n.49]), because while a natural or created agent can induce a quality in the body that is incompossible with passive animation of the body, it cannot cause any quality in the body on which would necessarily follow, by absolute necessity, the animation of the body; so the consequence is not valid, for no disposition caused in the body by a natural agent is cause simply of the passive animation of the body (an example: fire can by its action cause a quality suited for separating soul from body, but it cannot cause any necessity for uniting the intellective soul to the body -I mean fire cannot do so by itself alone).

53. On the contrary: it is commonly said [Richard of Middleton] that a natural agent does induce a disposition in the organic body, namely the perfect organization and due complexion of the elements, which is the simply necessitating disposition for inducing the soul.

54. I reply that no disposition induced in matter by a natural agent is a necessitating disposition for the infusion of the soul (but whatever the disposition is, since it exists on the part of the matter under matter’s idea of being receptive of form and in potency to form, that disposition is in contradictive potency to the intellective soulMetaphysics 9.8.1050b8-12: “Every power is a power at once for contradiction:...what is possible to be is able to be and not to be.” ⁹⁹). For if it were such a necessitating disposition, then the disposition induced in matter by a natural agent would necessitate God’s causing and creating the soul and animation of the body - which is false. The Philosopher, however, would have to say it, because he posited that God acts naturally and does whatever he does by necessity of nature [Ord. 1 d.8 n.251-252]. And so, just as the Philosopher posits that, when air is supremely hot and supremely disposed for the form of fire, the necessary result is that fire acts on the air and corrupts its form as air, so he would posit that, when the organic body is disposed by the action of a natural agent, God necessarily creates the soul in the body by animating the body. But just as the Philosopher erred in that principle (positing that God creates everything by necessity of nature), so theologians, by rejecting the Philosopher as to that principle, must necessarily reject him as to the conclusion, because no natural agent can simply necessitate matter for passive animation. Rather any disposition caused in matter by a natural agent is in contradictive power to form and to animation by God, for God causes voluntarily and contingently whatever he causes that is outside himself.

55. To the second objection [n.50], when it is said that Christ’s passion was then not meritorious, I say that the will can have a meritorious act about any object that is not in its power, or indeed that is necessarily unable to be otherwise, just as the will can love God with love of friendship by willing him good, namely by willing him to be just and wise and other things of the sort, and yet, whether the will wills or not, God is wise, just, etc. Thus too Christ’s will could have had merit about Christ’s passion, although it was not in his will’s power to prevent it, namely by his consenting to the passion and accepting it because of the good following from it and because it was accepted by God.

56. To the third objection [n.51], when it is said that if it was not in the soul’s power not to suffer then the passion was coerced and not meritorious, I say that coercion is in one way opposed to what is natural [Physics 2.1.192b13-36, 8.4.255a2-4] and in another way opposed to what is voluntary [Ethics 3.1.1110a1-3]. In the first way, since it is natural for a stone to go downwards, it is coerced and against natural inclination for it to go upwards - and ‘going upwards’ is coerced in this way because opposed to the natural inclination of the stone. And in this way of speaking about what is coerced (the way it is against the natural inclination of nature itself), death was coerced because against the natural inclination of the body, because the natural inclination of the body is to be perfected by the soul. In another way the coerced is opposed to the voluntary, and then, according to what was said above [d.15 n.95], as to the way the passion was not wanted and yet as not wanted happened, the passion was coerced and Christ did not thus merit by suffering it; in another way, as willed and as accepted by the will, it is meritorious and not coerced. These points are made plain in d.15 nn.98, 100, 126.

D. To the Principal Arguments

57. To the first principal argument [n.9], when it is said that Christ’s soul dominated the body more than it did the appetite,     therefore etc     ., I say that the soul does not dominate the body (as to every potency that belongs to the body) more than it dominates the sense appetite; indeed it dominates less, for as to the powers of the vegetative soul that belong to the body it does not dominate the body, but it does dominate as to the motive power, so that the soul can move the body hither and thither in place and to this work or to that work as it pleases. But it is not thus with the vegetative powers, because these are wholly irrational and not obedient to the soul in their acts; for although it is in the power of the soul to provide them with the matter on which they act, yet once the matter is provided to them they are not subject to the dominion of the soul in their acts; and so from impure intake of food and weakening of power in converting it, the power would have been corruptible and death would have followed. Again, Christ’s soul did not so dominate the sense appetite that his sense appetite could not suffer, but he was truly in pain; therefore he did not so dominate his body that, because of the domination of the soul, it could not suffer. And so the argument assumes something false, namely that ‘his soul dominated his sense appetite so that it did not suffer, and thus it dominated his body more’.

58. To the second argument, from John [n.10], I say that the ‘I’ in the supposit or subject place [‘I have power...’] and in apposition [‘.. .from myself’] stand for the same person but not according to the same nature, as follows: ‘I, the supposit of the Word according to divine nature, lay down my soul from myself according to human nature, because I lay down my soul from my body and not from the Word’; so that the ‘power of laying down and separating’ are attributed to the Word, but ‘his soul suffering separation from the body’ he did by reason of human nature, where the separation was made.

59. The answer to the third argument [n.11] is plain from the same point, that as ‘man’ he received the commandment of laying down his soul: he laid down his soul by consenting to it and suffering it, but not by effecting it, such that the effecting of it was in the soul’s power. Such an exposition of the text is not a forced one, because the same authority can be expounded partly of the head and partly of the members, as in this case, ‘he was able to sin and did not sin’ [Ecclesiasticus 31.10], where ‘being able to sin’ is expounded of the members and ‘not sinning’ is expounded of the head; thus one and the same thing can in one respect be expounded of Christ as he is an eternal supposit, and by reason of his being a supposit in divine nature, and in another respect of the created nature in the supposit.

60. To the fourth argument [n.12], about the loud cry, I say that it was another miracle, namely that he cried aloud even in the hour of death, or it was by the power of the Word; and so his soul was miraculously separated from the body before the hour of separation due to the violence of the passion. But it was not a new miracle that he thus cried in the hour of death, but it came from the old miracle whereby his glory did not redound to his body - just as everything that he suffered was in some way miraculous, although natural, because what could not happen save by presupposing a miracle could, even though a miracle was presupposed, come about naturally - but this natural coming about was in a way a miracle in relation to the necessarily presupposed miracle. However, the fact that Christ suffered in body and sensitive soul, or in the lower part of reason or even in the higher part, was because of the miracle that the glory of his soul did not redound to the body, nor to the lower part. Therefore the whole of what he suffered was a miracle and yet happened naturally once the miracle was performed (just as the man born blind sees naturally when his eye has been miraculously illumined, and as the body lives naturally when the intellective soul is supernaturally added to it).